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1 For instance, the Bank of
Canada has this kind of limited
role in the Canadian payments
system, which is operated by
the Canadian Payments
Association.  Bank for
International Settlements
(1989) describes the roles of
central banks in the payments
systems of several nations.











he payment functions of central banks
vary among nations.  Some central
banks provide only limited payment
services, such as issuing and redeeming
currency and facilitating settlement among
members of payments systems by transfer-
ring reserve balances.1 In the United States,
the Federal Reserve has been a provider of
payment services since the early 1900s.  By
1918, the Fed had acquired a large share of
the nation’s check-collection activities, espe-
cially in clearing interregional checks, and
the Fed had begun processing wire transfers
of reserves among banks.
The Federal Reserve recently has
been re-examining the appropriateness
of its role in processing checks and
automated clearinghouse payments
(Rivlin 1997).  To provide a more com-
plete background for these deliberations,
this article examines the validity of argu-
ments for the Fed’s initial entry into its
payment activities.  Before the Fed was
established, critics of the operation of
the payments system argued that interre-
gional check collection (collecting and
paying banks located in different com-
munities) was inefficient; they main-
tained that indirectly routing checks to
avoid exchange charges by paying banks
lengthened the collection process and
resulted in higher operating expenses 
for banks than more direct routing from
collecting banks to paying banks. 
An evaluation of whether Reserve Bank
services made the payments system more
efﬁcient rests on the nature of the payments
system prior to the Fed’s formation.  There-
fore, the ﬁrst section of this article describes
the payments system before Congress
established the Fed, and the second section
develops a theoretical framework for exam-
ining the effects of innovations on payments
system efﬁciency.  Subsequent sections
describe the legal foundation of the Fed’s
collection services, trace the development 
of Reserve Bank services, and examine the
evidence for and against the argument for
improved payments system efﬁciency.
PAYMENTS SYSTEM OPERA-
TION PRIOR TO 1914
This section focuses on payment instru-
ments and methods of collection in the
United States from the Civil War until the
formation of the Fed in 1914 (the National
Banking Era).  
Payment Instruments
Prior to the Civil War, the most impor-
tant means of payment was currency.  The
dollar value of currency in the hands of
the public exceeded the value of deposits,
and the dollar value of currency payments
exceeded the value of payments by check.
After the 1850s, in contrast, checks became
more important than currency.  The dollar
value of deposits exceeded that of currency,
and the value of transactions settled with
checks exceeded that settled with currency
(Spahr 1926, pp. 84-98).
By the 1870s, currency consisted of
coins minted by the federal government,
U.S. notes ﬁrst issued during the Civil
War, and national banknotes.  Federal leg-
islation in the 1860s taxed out of existence
the notes of state-chartered banks.  Custo-
mers of national and state-chartered banks,
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2 Some drafts were created by
individuals or businesses,
drawn upon the bank accounts
of other individuals or business-
es, and deposited with the cre-
ators’ banks for collection.
Such drafts were not common.
Banks would process them only
if the payor and payee were
well known to the paying and
collecting banks and the banks
were familiar with the business
arrangement between payor
and payee. 
3 See Garbade and Silber
(1979).  Howard and Johnson
(1910, p. 117) lists the cost of
shipping currency between
major ﬁnancial centers as fol-
lows: between New York and
Chicago, 50 cents per $1,000;
between St. Louis and New
York, 60 cents; between New
Orleans and New York, 75
cents; and between San
Francisco and New York, $1.50.
4 Phillips (1997) argues that the
Fed’s services made the pay-
ments system less efﬁcient by
encouraging bank customers to
maximize ﬂoat by using checks
rather than drafts.  A problem
with Phillips’ analysis is that the
use of checks for interregional
payments predated the forma-
tion of the Fed, although Fed
services may have stimulated an
even greater use of checks for
interregional payments.
5 For more details on the history
of check-collection practices and
the effects of Reserve Bank
payment services, see Jessup
(1967), Magee (1923), and
Preston (1920).
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however, settled a large share of their pay-
ment obligations with checks and drafts
drawn upon the deposit liabilities of banks.
To understand the operation of the U.S.
payments system during the National Bank-
ing Era, it is necessary to distinguish
between checks and drafts.  Bank depositors
created checks payable to those with whom
they wished to settle obligations.  The bank
that accepted a check for collection would
then seek payment from the bank on which
the check was drawn.  Drafts, in contrast,
were written by banks.2 A bank might draw
a draft upon itself or upon an account that
it maintained at another bank.  When
making a payment in a distant city, a bank
customer often purchased from his local
bank a draft drawn on a bank in a major
ﬁnancial center.  The bank on which the
draft was drawn would be better known to
the payee than the bank that had created
the draft.  In addition, the costs of collection
borne by the payee would be smaller for a
draft drawn upon a bank in a ﬁnancial
center than for a check drawn upon the
deposit account of the payor. 
Selling drafts was a source of revenue for
banks, since customers paid banks more than
the face amount of the drafts.  The business of
selling drafts involved the expense of main-
taining balances with the banks in major
ﬁnancial centers.  When drafts cleared, gener-
ally through clearinghouses in the ﬁnancial
centers, the banks on which they were drawn
would debit the accounts of the banks that
had sold the drafts.
Banks often used transactions in local
markets for domestic exchange to reple-
nish their balances with banks in the
ﬁnancial centers.  Banks located in various
communities established these markets for
trading their coin and currency with other
local banks that had balances due from
banks located in ﬁnancial centers.  The
rates of exchange in these markets ﬂuctu-
ated over time.  Sometimes there were
discounts on coin and currency and some-
times there were premiums. The limits on
these exchange rates were determined by
the cost of shipping coin and currency
among cities, a service provided by express
companies.3 These domestic exchange
rates for various cities were published in
the local newspapers. 
While the available data on payments
do not distinguish between checks and
drafts, descriptions of banking practices
indicate that, early in the National Banking
Era, individuals and businesses generally
made payments outside their communities
with drafts purchased from their banks
that were drawn on banks in major ﬁnan-
cial centers.  Over time, it became more
common for individuals and businesses to
settle their interregional obligations with
checks drawn upon their own accounts at
their local banks.  
Preston (1920, p. 566) and Jones (1931,
pp. 172-73) date the use of checks for inter-
regional payments to around 1890.  One
indication of when this change occurred is
the timing of actions by banks in major
ﬁnancial centers for collecting checks drawn
on banks outside of these ﬁnancial centers.
Spahr (1926, pp. 119-30) lists a series of
proposals and actions by banks to collect
out-of-town checks, beginning in 1885.  In
1899, the clearinghouses of New York and
Boston implemented plans for collecting
out-of-town checks.  The New York plan
attempted to eliminate altogether the use of
out-of-town checks for settlement of pay-
ments in New York City.  The Boston plan,
which was more successful, attempted to
impose collection at par (face amount) for
all checks drawn upon banks located
throughout New England.  From the timing
of these actions, we can infer that a major
shift in interregional payments—from drafts
to checks—occurred around the end of the
last century.4
Methods of Collecting Checks
As the number of check transactions
during the National Banking Era grew, a
system for clearing these checks among
thousands of banks had to be developed.5
The method of collecting checks depended
on the distance between the collecting and
paying banks.  Banks collected checks
drawn upon banks in their communities
through local clearinghouses or by
presenting the checks at the place ofFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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business of the paying banks.  Typically,
banks collected these local checks quickly
and at par.  
Collecting checks involved more time
and expense when the paying bank was
located in a different community.  Moreover,
the nature of banking law contributed to the
time and expense of interregional check col-
lection.  While banking law required that
banks pay at par for checks presented at
their place of business, banks could pay less
than par for checks presented to them by
mail or other indirect means.  The rationale
for this deduction from the face amount,
called an exchange charge, was that paying
banks could incur certain expenses in remit-
ting payment to out-of-town collecting
banks, including the cost of transporting
coin or banknotes to the collecting banks.
But when the staff of collecting banks or
their agents personally presented the checks
to the paying banks, they assumed the
expense of transmitting the cash to the col-
lecting banks.
Delays created another expense for
collecting banks.  Under banking law, a
paying bank that received checks through
the mail became the collecting agent for
the bank that had sent the checks.  The
paying bank was therefore responsible for
obtaining payment from itself.  As a result,
paying banks often remitted funds to col-
lecting banks several days after receiving
checks through the mail.  
It was considered negligence for a bank
to collect checks by sending them to paying
banks through the mail (Spahr 1926, p. 104).
Depositors could argue legally that a bank
which mailed checks to out-of-town paying
banks should absorb any exchange charges
and credit the accounts of depositors at par
because the bank had been negligent in its
collection practices.
Collecting banks attempted to mini-
mize delays, exchange charges, and claims
of negligence by using correspondent
banks to collect checks drawn upon banks
located outside their communities.  These
correspondent banks competed for check-
collection business, and in attempting to
give collecting banks the best terms (quick-
est collection at the lowest exchange
charges), they developed methods to limit
the exchange charges imposed by paying
banks.  The correspondents developed net-
works of banks that acted as their agents in
presenting checks over the counter to banks
that set relatively high exchange charges.
In collecting through correspondents and
their agents, depository banks might receive
less than the face amount of checks, but more
than if the checks had been sent to the paying
banks through the mail.  Also, depositors in
the collecting banks would not have legal
grounds for charging the banks with negli-
gence in their collection practices.
The indirect routing of checks to
paying banks through the agents of corre-
Evidence suggests that banks earned
economic rents from exchange charges.
Nonpar banks tended to be outside of
urban areas, and when their depositors sent
checks to payees outside their communities,
getting these checks back to their banks was
slow or expensive.  Jessup (1967) indicates
that banks which continued to impose
exchange charges several decades after the
Fed launched its collection system were pri-
marily small banks in isolated communities
of states that restricted branch banking.
Also, banks tended to eliminate exchange
charges when par banks opened ofﬁces in
their communities.  The banks that resisted
the Fed’s plan were primarily relatively
small banks in areas remote from ﬁnancial
centers.  One interpretation of their resis-
tance to the Fed’s plan might be that  the
Fed attempted to deprive banks of revenue
necessary for covering their cost of making
payments to the Fed.  In 1918, however, the
Fed offered to pay the transaction expenses
for nonmember banks, if such banks agreed
to pay the Fed at par.  This offer did not
eliminate nonpar banks’ resistance to Fed
efforts to establish a national system for col-
lection at par.
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spondents deprived paying banks of
exchange charges because agents presented
checks in person to the paying banks and
demanded payment at par.  The paying
banks still beneﬁted, however, from any
delays in the collection process that may
have resulted when checks were routed
through correspondents and their agents.
The process of collecting checks
through correspondents as a means of
avoiding exchange charges led to some
notorious cases of checks passing through
the ofﬁces of many banks and traveling
over very long distances, relative to the
actual distances between the depository
banks and the paying banks.  More direct
channels would have enabled more rapid
and less expensive collection.
Correspondent banks attempted to
bring order and efﬁciency to the collection
process.  Some of them made arrange-
ments with speciﬁc banks to collect at par
checks drawn upon those banks.  The cor-
respondents negotiated various arrange-
ments with the paying banks on these par
lists.  In some cases, the correspondents
were paid at par for checks drawn upon
accounts of depositors in the paying
banks.  In addition, the banks on these par
lists often served as agents for their corre-
spondents in obtaining collection at par
from other  banks in their communities
(Vest 1940, p. 90).  Other correspondents,
in contrast, offered to pay exchange
charges on checks that they sent to banks
for collection, and to credit the accounts of
these banks at par for checks received from
them.  The respondents paid for this service
by maintaining balances at the correspon-
dents (Tippetts 1929, pp. 258-59).  Some
banks maintained balances with several cor-
respondents in major cities so they would
receive exchange charges on almost all of the
checks presented to them by out-of-town
banks (Willis 1951, pp. 7-9).
The savings in operating expenses and
interbank balances that resulted from
using correspondents’ collection services
By using the services of express compa-
nies, banks could have collected checks at
par without the indirect routing that was so
common before the Fed introduced its
check-collection services.  Employees of the
express companies could take checks to the
paying banks, demand payment at par, and
return to the collecting banks with the
funds.  But histories of check collection
prior to the formation of the Fed do not
mention such arrangements.  An extensive
discussion of the use of express companies
involves the Reserve Banks’ collection of
checks drawn upon nonpar banks.  Prior to
a key ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1923, the Reserve Banks accepted for collec-
tion checks drawn upon all banks, including
those that refused to pay the Fed at par.
One of the Fed’s objectives in accepting
checks drawn upon these nonpar banks was
to make its collection service as useful as
possible for the banks that chose to collect
checks through the Fed.  In some cases,
express agents were the only means
available to the Fed of obtaining par collec-
tion from nonpar banks.  Descriptions in
Harding (1920) indicate that the Reserve
Banks generally accumulated at least $100
in checks drawn upon a nonpar bank before
delivering them to an express company for
collection.  The Fed’s justiﬁcation for accu-
mulating checks drawn upon nonpar banks
was to limit collection costs; a statement by
Harding indicates that express companies
had a minimum charge of 10 or 15 cents per
item for checks in denominations as low as
$5.  Charges per item were smaller when the
Fed had $100 or more to collect from a
paying bank.  These minimum charges may
indicate why private banks did not often use
express companies for collecting of out-of-
town checks.  The Fed’s collection practices
reﬂected its objective of establishing collec-
tion at par as the national standard, not
the objective of proﬁt maximization.
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were limited by the large number of banks
and the complexity of correspondent bank-
ing relationships.  A depository bank or its
correspondent had to maintain lists of
paying banks for which correspondents pro-
vided par collection, and they had to route
checks to the appropriate correspondents.
Unless the correspondents of the depository
and paying banks maintained balances with
each other, a check would pass through
other intermediaries with which these cor-
respondents maintained accounts.  A check
might pass through several banks in the
collection process.  Thus, the arrangements
for collecting interregional checks through
correspondents encouraged indirect rout-
ing of checks and forced a complex matrix
of interbank balances to facilitate the
collection system.6
Banks in some cities attempted to coop-
erate in coping with the challenge of collect-
ing out-of-town checks.  For instance, the
Boston clearinghouse established a plan in
1899 for par collection of checks drawn
upon all banks located in New England
(Hallock 1903).  The plan, modeled after
the earlier Suffolk system for the circulation
of banknotes at par (Spahr 1926, p. 127),
was largely successful.7 While some rural
banks in New England did not join the par
collection system, approximately 97 percent
of checks in New England were collected at
par (Spahr 1926, pp. 126-29).
Members of the New York clearing-
house, in contrast, agreed to impose high
fees on customers who deposited checks
drawn on out-of-town banks.  Their objec-
tive was to eliminate the use of out-of-town
checks for payments in New York City.
The banks agreed to charge a minimum fee
of 10 cents per check, with higher fees on
relatively large out-of-town checks.  The
penalty for a bank that cheated on this
agreement was $5,000 for a ﬁrst offense
and expulsion from the clearinghouse for
the second offense (Spahr 1926, pp. 125-
26).  New York ﬁrms, however, continued
to accept out-of-town checks in payment,
collecting the checks through correspon-
dent banks located in other ﬁnancial
centers, often with longer collection
periods and higher expenses than would
have been possible if the New York banks
had collected the checks.
The inefficiencies of the payments
system that resulted from this collusion
among New York City banks might have
been remedied through antitrust enforce-
ment, rather than through government
involvement in check collection.  But
when the Fed was founded, such collu-
sive agreements among banks were
common, and they were not subjected 
to antitrust enforcement.  For instance,
members of clearinghouses often agreed
on the maximum interest rates they
would pay on deposits (Cannon 1910, 
pp. 11-23).
The check-collection process created
settlement obligations among banks in
different communities.  If the banks did
not hold balances with each other, they
generally settled among themselves with
drafts drawn upon banks in major ﬁnan-
cial centers.  The most important center
was New York City; drafts drawn upon
New York banks served as the national
currency for interbank settlement.8 This
method of settlement relied on the opera-
tion of markets for domestic exchange,
through which banks in the same commu-
nity traded coin and currency for balances





To examine the implications of
Reserve Bank services for payments sys-
tem efﬁciency, one needs to develop a
framework for deﬁning efﬁciency.  The
framework in this article is based on that
developed by Berger, Hancock, and Mar-
quardt (1996), hereafter BHM.  Their
analytical framework, derived from
welfare theory, emphasizes a trade-off
between risks and costs in the payments
system, and the effects of innovations on
this trade-off.  This section describes the
framework and uses it to examine issues in
payments system efﬁciency around the
time the Fed was founded.
6 Weinberg (1997, p. 39)
argues that the circuitous rout-
ing of checks prior to the for-
mation of the Fed does not
necessarily indicate that the
check-collection networks oper-
ated by correspondents were
inefﬁcient.  While these net-
works may have been efﬁcient
under the existing constraints
on bank behavior and legal
relationships between collecting
and paying banks, such an
argument does not prove that
the collection system could not
be made more efﬁcient through
regulatory changes (such as
permission for nationwide
branch banking) or government
provision of clearing services.
7 For analysis of the Suffolk sys-
tem, see Calomiris and Kahn
(1996) or Rolnick, Smith, and
Weber (in this issue).
8 Citing a survey of national
banks in 1890, the Comptroller
of the Currency (1890, p. 16)
reported that 63.1 percent of
bank drafts (dollar value) were
drawn upon banks in New York
City, compared with 9.4 percent
on banks in Chicago and 1.6
percent on banks in St. Louis. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical
framework.  The axes measure the risk and
costs borne by payors, payees, and related
parties.  The risk borne by any one party
reﬂects the distribution of that party’s pay-
ments-activity losses; the vertical axis in
Figure 1 measures some combination of
these risk measures for all the parties bear-
ing such risks.  Similarly, the horizontal
axis measures the weighted sum of costs
borne by all the parties.
The curve FF represents the frontier of
minimum risk in operating the payments
system for a given cost and the minimum
cost for a given risk.  The position of the
curve depends upon the technology used to
process and settle payments, ﬁnancial tech-
niques for monitoring and controlling risk,
and the regulatory environment, all of
which may be altered by innovations.
Thus, BHM classiﬁes innovations in the
operation of the payments system as
technological, ﬁnancial, or regulatory inno-
vations.  The convex shape of the frontier
reﬂects the usual assumption of diminish-
ing marginal returns—as risks get lower
(moving toward the horizontal axis), the
marginal costs of further risk reductions
increase.  All of the points in the area above
and to the right of the efﬁcient frontier, FF,
as well as those on the frontier, are feasible
outcomes.  Points off the frontier, however,
reﬂect inefﬁcient choices from a social
viewpoint, in that both risk and costs
could be reduced.  For instance, the risk
and cost combination A is inefﬁcient; the
cost of operating at the same level of risk
on the frontier (point B) would be lower.
Curve II reﬂects the social utility func-
tion.  Since greater risk and greater cost
reduce social welfare, shifting curve II to
the left increases social welfare (lower cost
for given risk).  Given the frontier curve FF,
the point of highest social welfare is repre-
sented by point C, where the II and FF
curves are tangent.  Innovations improve
payments system efﬁciency if they shift
society to a higher indifference curve.
BHM develops this framework with
rather general concepts of risk and cost.  This
section describes the U.S. payments system
prior to 1915 using the BHM framework.
The Nature of Risk and Cost in
Payments System Operation
Point D on the FF frontier reﬂects the
minimum cost associated with an arrange-
ment in which all payments are made in
cash.  Risk would be low, but cost would
be high, especially for interregional
payments.  While point D is on the FF
frontier, it does not represent the point of
maximum social welfare because of the
high cost of minimizing risk with cash
payments.  Other payment arrangements,
based on the use of checks and drafts,
involved more risk: the possibility of losses
from bad checks, from account closures
for insufﬁcient funds, and from bank fail-
ures.  The observation that not all pay-
ments were settled in coin and currency
prior to 1915 indicates that, to economize
on the cost of settling payment obligations,
individuals and ﬁrms were willing to accept
more than the minimal level of risk illus-
trated by point D. 
The Comptroller of the Currency
(1890) and Garbade and Silber (1979)
mention that innovations in communi-
cations and transportation over time
reduced the cost of transporting coin and
currency over long distances.  In the frame-
work of BHM, these technological
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The Risk-Cost Frontier for
the Payments System
Figure 1innovations cause the FF curve to shift to
the left over time (greater efﬁciency of the
payments system) by reducing the cost asso-
ciated with minimum risk (all payments in
cash).  In addition, the Comptroller of the
Currency (1890) indicated that the fees
banks charged for drafts drawn upon banks
in ﬁnancial centers declined sharply over
time.  In terms of this theoretical frame-
work, technological innovations tended to
enhance social welfare by reducing the cost
of interregional payments.
The relevant operating costs of the pay-
ments system in this analysis are as follows:
1. The cost of transporting coin and
currency (one option for settling
obligations).
2. The cost of collecting checks, 
including the cost (borne primarily
by correspondent banks) of routing
out-of-town checks to paying banks.
3. The cost of operating the markets 
for domestic exchange that existed
prior to the formation of the Fed.
4. The opportunity cost of holding 
cash balances.
Exchange Charges and Social Welfare
Given the prominence of exchange
charges in Fed policies for payments system
operation, their role in the framework of
Figure 1 deserves special attention.  Since
exchange charges were a cost to some banks
and bank customers, should we include
them in the measure of cost in Figure 1?  
If so, eliminating  exchange charges would
tend to shift the FF curve to the left, increas-
ing social welfare.  In contrast, banks that
imposed exchange charges viewed Reserve
Bank activities to promote check clearance at
par as a threat to their welfare.  How should
our measure of social welfare reﬂect their
view of what was in their interest?
BHM (p. 701) mentions that some
participants might prefer an inefﬁcient
arrangement for the payments system (a
combination of risk and cost off the FF
curve) if that arrangement would impose
the extra costs or risk on other participants.
Thus, changes in payment arrangements
that enhance efﬁciency are not necessarily
in the interest of each participant in the
payments system. 
Many banks located outside urban areas
resisted the Fed’s plan for national par clear-
ance of checks, since they wanted to main-
tain their revenue from exchange charges.9
Their resistance, however, does not neces-
sarily indicate that the Fed’s system reduced
social welfare. 
On the other hand, eliminating
exchange charges would not necessarily
increase welfare.  Welfare theory focuses
on the implications of changes in market
practices for the pricing of goods and for
the quantity of market output, not on the
effects of such changes on the distribu-
tion of profits among firms that sell the
goods (Scherer 1970, pp. 8-38).  Exchange
charges affected the allocation of profits
among banks, in that they were revenue
to some banks and expenses to others.
Exchange charges would reduce welfare 
if the efforts by participants to avoid such
charges increased the cost of payments
system operation (for a given level of
risk) above the level of cost that would
have been possible without the charges. 
Effects of Reserve Bank Payment
Services and the Discount Window
on System Efﬁciency
The inherent risks in the payments sys-
tem before the establishment of the Fed
included disruptions created by banking
panics.  For example, when banks in major
ﬁnancial centers suspended currency pay-
ments in response to panics, they restricted
depositors’ currency withdrawals.  Bank
failures resulting from such panics also dis-
rupted the system.  A major purpose for
establishing the Fed was to eliminate panics
by providing banks with reserves through
the discount window during liquidity crises
(Dwyer and Gilbert 1989).
The Fed could have reduced risk in
the payments system through its discount
9 Reserve Bank services reduced
substantially the role of drafts
drawn upon New York City
banks in the settlement of
interregional obligations.  After
the Fed established its collec-
tion system, however, the non-
par banks located outside urban
areas, not the New York City
banks, opposed the Fed’s col-
lection system.
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127window operations without providing pay-
ment services.  The purpose of this article
is to assess the implications of Reserve
Bank payment services in terms of risk vs.
cost, independent of the effects of discount
window operations.
The challenge of separating these
effects of Fed policies is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.  Let us suppose that point A in Fig-
ure 1 represents the risk-cost combination
for the payments system under the banking
laws and regulations of 1913, with the
addition of a central bank–operated dis-
count window but no central bank payment
services.  This central bank would provide
currency to banks that borrowed at the dis-
count window and credit the banks’ reserve
accounts when they deposited currency,
but it would not provide wire transfer ser-
vices, interbank settlement through debits
or credits to reserve accounts, or collection
services.  Now let us suppose that point C
on the FF curve represents the risk-cost
combination with all of the above, plus Fed-
eral Reserve Bank payment services. What
kind of inﬂuences would have kept the pri-
vate sector from moving to the efﬁciency
frontier on its own?  What was special about
the Fed that enabled it to improve the efﬁ-
ciency of the payments system?
The Reserve Banks did not invent a
new technology for check collection.
Development of their check collection ser-
vice was a regulatory innovation, reﬂecting
two aspects of the legal and regulatory
environment that existed prior to the
formation of the Fed.  
One legal barrier to efﬁcient check col-
lection may have been the principal-agent
relationship created when banks mailed
checks to other banks for collection; that
is, the paying bank became the agent of
the collecting bank, responsible for col-
lecting from itself.  This legal relationship
created a disincentive for banks to collect
interregional checks by the most direct
method, the mail service.  Instead, they
sent checks to correspondents, who did
the collection for them.  
A second legal barrier to efﬁcient oper-
ation of the system may have been restric-
tions on nationwide branch banking.  If the
major correspondent banks had ofﬁces
located throughout the nation, they could
have routed checks directly to their own
ofﬁces that were nearest to the ofﬁces of the
paying banks and had their employees pre-
sent the checks for par collection.  Instead,
correspondents had to develop ad hoc
arrangements for getting checks to paying
banks through networks of correspondents
and respondents.  The Reserve Banks, with
their nationwide network of ofﬁces and
legal authority to demand remittance at par
from member banks, may have reduced the
cost of interregional check collection by
reducing operating expenses and shortening
collection times.  In addition, shorter collec-
tion times may have reduced risk by
reducing the possibility that checks would
be dishonored or that the paying bank
would fail prior to settlement.  A later sec-
tion examines the evidence for and against
the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve’s
collection services improved payments
system efﬁciency.
Relevant Comparisons in Assessing
Fed Services Efﬁciency
In evaluating the evidence, it is impor-
tant to make appropriate comparisons.  It
is possible that payments system efﬁciency
would have been more improved if Con-
gress had permitted nationwide branch
banking instead of authorizing the Reserve
Banks to offer payment services.  In Figure 1,
if FF reﬂects the efﬁcient frontier for the
payments system given Fed payment ser-
vices and restrictions on branching as of
1913, nationwide branch banking (with or
without Fed services) might have shifted
the frontier farther to the left.  The evi-
dence in this article, however, does not
allow us to explore that hypothesis. 
It is also possible that the Reserve
Banks’ entry into the payments business
precluded future innovations by the
private sector that would have shifted the
FF curve farther to the left in the absence
of Reserve Bank services.  While the Fed
has encouraged innovation in the opera-
tion of the payments system in recent
decades (Summers and Gilbert 1996, 
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cle is not relevant for judging whether
Reserve Bank participation in the payments
system has, on net, retarded or enhanced
payments system efﬁciency over the many
years since the Fed’s founding.
Finally, in assessing the limitations of
the data, one should note a critique of
Reserve Bank payment services by Baxter
(1983).  He developed an economic theory
of relationships among payors, payees, and
their banks (assuming they use different
banks for payment services).  In modeling
the demand for payment services, Baxter
notes that a transaction involves a joint
demand by payor and payee for method of
payment and, on the supply side, the coop-
eration of two banks.  Baxter notes that the
arrangement that maximizes welfare is
likely to involve a side payment, or “inter-
change fee,” between the two banks.  He
also argues that in a payments system with
many payors, payees, and banks, negotia-
tions among these parties over the allocation
of costs and fees for each transaction would
be inefﬁcient.  Thus, he argues that an
efﬁcient payments system will have some
standard practice for interchange fees
among banks.
Baxter describes arrangements in
credit card associations as reflecting effi-
cient pricing in a segment of the pay-
ments system.  In contrast, Baxter (1983,
p. 571) criticizes the Federal Reserve for
imposing par clearance in the check col-
lection system:
Thus the role of the exchange fee in the
process of check clearance, a commer-
cial context in which an unregulated
market solution might have been
expected to work reasonably well and
to yield instructive results, was aborted
and continues to be suppressed by a
mixture of subsidies and coercion by
the Federal Reserve System.
Baxter does not attempt to prove that
check collection at par was inefﬁcient.
Rather, he suggested that interchange fees
in check collection might have been neces-
sary for maximum efﬁciency in payments
system operations.  Baxter notes, however,
that prior to the formation of the Fed,
members of clearinghouses cleared checks
among themselves at par.  The clearing-
houses would have been free to set
interchange fees among their members if
they felt that such fees would make the
payments system more efﬁcient.  
There is an important reason why
clearinghouses cleared checks at par:  The
common law requirement that a bank pay
at par when checks drawn upon its deposi-
tors’ accounts were presented at its place
of business.  This legal standard for par
collection limited pricing options for clear-
inghouses.  Since clearinghouses are
cooperatives set up to avoid the cost of
bilateral exchange, they could not function
effectively if members could avoid paying
interchange fees by presenting checks
directly to each other.  Credit card associa-
tions are effective in imposing interchange
fees because their members do not have
the option of collecting credit card receiv-
ables from each other directly at par.  The
courts limit the rights of banks with credit
card receivables to the rights speciﬁed by
their card associations.
Baxter’s framework suggests that
changing banking law to eliminate the
requirement for banks to remit at par for
checks presented at their place of business
might have led to greater payments system
efﬁciency than did the Reserve Banks’
entry into the payments system.
Eliminating the requirement for payment at
par might have facilitated private-sector
development of check-clearing organizations
similar to today’s national credit card associa-
tions.  These check-clearing organizations
would have set the interchange fee for max-
imum payments system efﬁciency, thus shift-
ing the FF curve to the left.
In considering the effects of Reserve
Bank operations on payments system efﬁ-
ciency, we should note that the Fed did not
have the prerogative to eliminate the
requirement for paying banks to remit at
par for checks presented at their place of
business.  While Baxter’s theoretical frame-
work is interesting, his critique of the Fed
is not relevant for judging whether Reserve
MAY/JUNE 1998
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
129Bank operations improved the efﬁciency of
the payments system, given the legal and





The history of the Fed’s role in the
payments system has been shaped largely
by acts of Congress and litigation.  In
tracing this history, it is necessary to
examine the legal foundation of the Fed’s
role in the payments system in some
detail.  The Federal Reserve Act (FRA) as
enacted in 1913 did not state clearly the
Congressional intent for the Fed’s role in
the payments system.  Section 13 autho-
rizes the Reserve Banks to receive checks
from any member banks drawn upon other
member banks.  Section 16 states that
Reserve Banks shall receive checks from
member banks at par, and it authorizes the
Board of Governors to establish a clearing-
house for clearing checks and drafts among
the Reserve Banks.  Did these sections
simply direct the Fed to provide payment
services to member banks, or did they pro-
vide the Fed with a mandate to make the
collection of checks at par the national
standard for the banking industry?
These sections of the FRA have been
subject to various interpretations.  From its
earliest beginnings, the Board of Governors
interpreted them as giving the Fed a man-
date to establish a national system for par
clearance of checks.  In a recent review of
the legislative history of the FRA, however,
Stevens (1996) concludes that the Fed’s
founders did not see a need for a govern-
ment service to deal with inefﬁciencies in
the nation’s check-collection system.
Rather, Stevens argues that the founders
included these sections in the FRA on
check collection to make reserve balances
useful for member banks.  In Stevens’ argu-
ment, the founders were concerned that
banks would resent the opportunity cost of
holding idle balances at the Reserve Banks,
and their resentment might undermine the
Fed’s effectiveness in providing an elastic
currency and acting as lender of last resort
in ﬁnancial crises.  Stevens argues that the
collection system was to be the glue that
tied banks to the Fed.  In drawing this
conclusion, he emphasizes some state-
ments by the founders about the need to
make reserve balances useful for members.
He also cites the fact that sections dealing
with check collection were added to legis-
lation for a central bank late in the
legislative process.10
An amendment to the FRA in June
1917 helps clarify Congressional intent
involving the Reserve Banks’ check-collec-
tion services.  One provision allowed
nonmember banks to become clearing
members of the Reserve Banks.  These
clearing members could present checks at
their Reserve Banks for collection if they
held clearing balances.  Proceeds from col-
lecting the checks would be credited to the
clearing account, and the value of checks
that were received by the Reserve Bank and
drawn upon the clearing member would be
charged to its clearing account.
A second provision of the amendment
as originally proposed by Senator Hardwick
would limit bank exchange charges to no
more than one-tenth of 1 percent (10 cents
per $100) of the face value of a check.  The
proposed legislation would have permitted
member banks to impose exchange charges,
within the speciﬁed limit, on the Reserve
Banks.  While the bill was in conference
(versions having passed the House and
Senate), President Wilson intervened in a
letter to Senator Hardwick:
I should regard such a provision
[Reserve Banks absorbing exchange
charges in their check collection activ-
ities] as most unfortunate and as
almost destructive of the function of
the Federal reserve banks as a clearing
house for member banks, a function
which they have performed with so
much beneﬁt to the business of the
country (Vest 1940, p. 91).
Because of Wilson’s intervention, the con-
ferees modiﬁed the section on exchange
charges by adding that “no such charges
10Harding (1925) presented an
alternative view for why the
Reserve Banks were involved in
check collection.  Member
banks would need methods of
increasing and decreasing their
actual reserve balances in
matching their reserves and
required reserves.  The Fed’s
check-collection services offered
a method of generating debits
and credits to reserve balances.
This purpose is more mundane
than that asserted by Stevens
and less ambitious than estab-
lishing par clearing as the
national standard.
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banks” (Vest 1940, p. 91).  This amend-
ment to the FRA indicates that Congress
viewed the Fed’s check-collection system
as more than just a means of giving member
banks some value for their required reserves.
If Congress had included provisions for a
check-collection system in the FRA in 1913
just to make membership in the Fed attrac-
tive, why would Congress grant nonmember
banks access to the clearing system in 1917?
Exchange charges against the Reserve
Banks would not have undermined the
purpose of giving member banks some
value for their reserve balances, since
industry practice involved paying
exchange charges.11 The Fed’s collection
system could have continued to serve as
the glue binding member banks to the Fed.
President Wilson’s intervention, however,
indicates that he considered the Fed’s par
collection system a valuable service to the
nation.  In modifying the bill to prohibit
exchange charges against the Reserve
Banks, Congress assented with this view.12
The other major legal developments
that shaped the nature of the Fed’s collec-
tion services involved litigation challenging
the Reserve Banks’ efforts to establish par
collection as standard practice throughout
the nation.  In the early years of the Fed’s
collection system, the Reserve Banks
accepted checks drawn upon all banks,
including those that had not agreed to pay
the Fed at par.  The Reserve Banks used a
variety of methods to collect at par from
these nonpar banks, including hiring
express agents to travel to the ofﬁces of the
nonpar banks, present checks over the
counter, and return with the funds.  Some
of the nonpar banks interpreted the Fed’s
collection practices as attempts to harass
them into agreeing to pay the Fed at par.13
Nonpar banks challenged the Fed’s
collection practices in the courts, and a
decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States was announced in 1923.
The Court ruled that since Congress did
not require the Fed to establish a national
system of par collection for checks, the
Reserve Banks could not compel nonmem-
ber banks to pay them at par.  In response
to this Court ruling, the Reserve Banks
restricted the checks they would accept for
collection to those drawn on the banks
that agreed to pay the Fed at par.  Banks
had to use other channels for collecting
checks drawn on nonpar banks. 
CHRONOLOGY OF RESERVE
BANK PAYMENT SERVICES
When the Reserve Banks began provid-
ing check-clearing services in 1915, the
Board of Governors initially pursued what it
called a voluntary collection system.  The
Reserve Banks would receive for collection
only those checks drawn upon banks that
had volunteered to join the Fed’s collection
system.  The banks had agreed to pay at par
for checks presented by the Fed for collec-
tion, even if the Fed sent the checks to the
paying banks through the postal service.
However, only about one-fourth of the
member banks joined the collection system.
In its annual report for 1916, the Board
expressed regret that the voluntary system
had not been more successful and conclu-
ded that the voluntary plan would never
achieve its objective of a universal par col-
lection system for the U.S. economy.  To
promote this goal, the Board decided in
April 1916 to change its collection plan
from voluntary to compulsory for member
banks.  Under this new plan, the Fed
required each member to remit at par for
checks the Reserve Banks presented for col-
lection, including checks sent through the
mail.  Member banks were not, however,
required to send checks to the Reserve
Banks for collection.
Introduction of Collection Fees
The Board also adopted a policy of
charging banks for the collection service:
Each Reserve Bank charged the depositing
bank a fee per check that reﬂected its
expenses.  Initially, the fees ranged from
0.9 cents to 2 cents per check.  At this
time, the Fed also stopped the practice of
immediately adding the value of checks to
the reserve accounts of collecting banks;
instead it deferred credit according to a
schedule based upon estimates of the time
11Willis (1923, pp. 1062-63)
asserted that passage of legis-
lation authorizing member
banks to impose exchange
charges on the Reserve Banks
would have destroyed the
Federal Reserve check-clearing
system.  Willis did not, howev-
er, provide the basis for that
assertion.
12The Board of Governors was
uncertain whether this legisla-
tion granted the Fed authority
to set limits on the exchange
charges of all banks or only
banks that were Fed members.
The Board requested the opin-
ion of the U.S. Attorney
General, who held that the
Board’s authority over
exchange charges under this
act applied only to Fed mem-
bers.  Because of this ruling,
the Board did not use its
authority over exchange
charges in its attempt to make
collection of checks at par the
national standard for the bank-
ing industry.  See Spahr
(1926, p. 200).
13See Harding (1920) for the
Federal Reserve Board’s
response to accusations by non-
par banks about the Fed’s
check-collection practices.
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checks to the paying banks (Willis 1923,
p. 1060).  Under the prior plan, a collect-
ing bank’s reserve account was credited
and the paying bank’s reserve account was
debited for the amount of the check when
the Fed received the check, before the pay-
ing bank had a chance to see it or learn of
the debit to its reserve account. Reserve
Bank annual reports for 1916 indicated
that members of the voluntary collection
system had objected to this timing of
debits to their reserve accounts.
Also during 1917 the Fed began
allowing banks to use transfer drafts for
settling their payment obligations with
other banks.  Banks with accounts at the
Reserve Banks could create transfer drafts
drawn upon their accounts, which were
then payable immediately at any Fed ofﬁce.
Member banks could therefore use transfer
drafts for interbank settlement instead of
drafts drawn upon their accounts at banks
in New York City.  For example, a bank in
St. Louis would write a draft drawn upon
its reserve account at the St. Louis Fed and
mail it to a bank in Atlanta.  The Atlanta
bank would get immediate credit to its
reserve account when it presented the draft
to the Atlanta Fed.  Settlement between the
two Reserve Banks would occur daily
through the gold exchange fund.
Participation by Nonmember Banks
An amendment of the FRA in 1916
permitted the Reserve Banks to collect
checks drawn upon nonmember banks.  In
June 1917, Congress amended the FRA in
response to a request by the Board to per-
mit the Reserve Banks to collect checks for
nonmember banks that opened clearing
accounts at their Reserve Banks.  The Fed
required these clearing members to pay the
Fed at par for checks drawn upon them.
Only a small number of nonmembers
joined the Fed’s collection system.14 Tip-
petts (1924, pp. 632-33) concluded that a
major reason why few nonmembers took
this option for check collection was the
nature of state reserve requirements.  Non-
member banks counted balances with
other banks as part of their reserves for
meeting state requirements, and banks
tended to count all of their funds deposi-
ted with correspondents, including
uncollected funds, as balances due from
banks.  The Fed’s accounting system, in
contrast, separated cash items in the
process of collection (CIPC) from balances
due from the Reserve Banks.  Nonmember
banks would thus tend to increase the
burden of state reserve requirements by
collecting checks through clearing accounts
at the Reserve Banks.15 These banks could
benefit from the Fed’s check-collection
system indirectly by clearing checks
through correspondents that used the Fed’s
collection system.
In 1918 the Fed began operating its
leased wire system for reserve transfers
among banks, an electronic alternative to
transfer drafts.  Also, in July 1918, the
Board ended the policy of charging fees to
banks that deposited checks with the
Reserve Banks for collection.  The objec-
tive for dropping the fees was to promote
use of the Fed’s collection system.  For the
nonmember banks that agreed to pay the
Fed at par, the Fed began absorbing the
expenses they incurred in remitting pay-
ment to the Reserve Banks.  One objective
of this offer was to eliminate the argument
that nonmember banks could not remit at
par because of the expenses they would
incur in remitting payment.  In response 
to a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1923, the Reserve Banks began refusing to
accept for collection checks drawn upon
nonpar banks.
Volumes of Reserve Bank Payment
Services
The Reserve Banks very quickly became
major processors of payments.  Table 1 pre-
sents the number of checks cleared by the
Reserve Banks and the dollar value of these
checks relative to the value of checks
cleared through the private clearinghouses.
In the period around the formation of the
Fed, data were available on the dollar value
of checks cleared through about 200 clear-
inghouses in cities around the nation,
14Willis and Steiner (1926, p.
607) reported that on July 1,
1925, only 158 nonmember
banks in seven Federal Reserve
districts maintained such clear-
ing accounts.
15Tippetts (1924) poses the
hypothesis that an option for
banks to meet their reserve
requirements with uncollected
funds will affect bank behavior.
Gilbert (1978) found evidence
in the 1970s to support this
hypothesis.  Prior to 1980, the
state-chartered banks that did
not choose to be Fed members
were exempt from Fed reserve
requirements but subject to
state requirements.  Some
states permitted banks to count
CIPC as part of their reserves,
whereas other states excluded
them.  Gilbert found that non-
member banks in states that
excluded CIPC from reserves
reported relatively low levels of
CIPC; they appeared to report
their uncollected funds as
demand balances due from
banks, a common practice prior
to the Fed’s formation.
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many relatively small cities.  While this
series does not reﬂect the dollar value of all
checks, it provides the broadest available
measure of check clearings outside the Fed-
eral Reserve System.16
In 1915, the Reserve Banks processed
8.8 million checks, with a dollar value of
$4.7 billion, which was about 3 percent of
the value cleared through the private clear-
inghouses.  The volume of checks processed
by the Fed’s clearing system rose rapidly
after the Fed adopted its compulsory plan in
1916, rising to about 33 percent of the clear-
ings through the private clearinghouses by
1918.  Table 1 indicates that clearings
through the Reserve Banks as a percentage
of clearings through private clearinghouses
continued to rise through 1934.17
Those familiar with the current infra-
structure of the Fed’s check-collection
system—which includes a ground and air
16See Garvy (1959) for a
description of the data on 
check clearings.
17The sharp rise in the Fed’s mar-
ket share after 1929 may
reﬂect a ﬂight to safety by
respondent banks during the
banking panics of the early
1930s.  That is, respondent
banks considered clearing
checks through the Reserve
Banks less risky than clearing
through private correspondents.
Respondent banks also
behaved in this way during the
1980s; the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas had a sharp rise
in its check clearings during the
Texas banking crisis (Clair,
Kolson and Robinson, 1995).
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Table 1
Volume of Checks Processed by the Reserve Banks
Value of Checks 
Processed by Reserved 
Dollar Value  Banks as Percentage
of Checks of Checks Cleared
Year Millions of Checks (billions of dollars) Through Clearinghouses
1915 8.8 $    4.7 2.9%
1916 25.8 10.9 4.5
1917 75.7 44.9 14.7
1918 154.4 105.7 32.9
1919 305.2 136.5 35.2
1920 452.1 156.5 35.6
1921 522.7 119.2 34.1
1922 584.9 150.5 39.1
1923 639.2 196.6 48.6
1924 684.0 209.1 46.9
1925 716.5 247.2 49.4
1926 758.5 261.4 51.0
1927 794.8 266.7 49.0
1928 818.5 289.0 46.4
1929 852.1 351.7 49.1
1930 834.2 311.2 57.2
1931 796.9 237.8 57.8
1932 677.0 169.2 65.4
1933 635.0 151.2 62.0
1934 754.7 171.9 65.1
SOURCES: Observations on check clearings by the Federal Reserve Banks are from the annual reports of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.  Data on the value of checks cleared through clearinghouses are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1960,
p. 640).  The annual observations for the number of checks cleared by the Reserve Banks, and the dollar value of the checks, are
adjusted to eliminate duplications in reports by the individual Reserve Banks.  A duplication occurs if two Reserve Banks report the
same item as one of their items handled.  The annual reports of the Board of Governors for 1919 through 1926 provide data on items
handled with and without duplications.  Data for 1915-18 reported with duplications have been adjusted in accordance with data for
1919, and data for the years 1927-34 have been adjusted in light of the data for 1926.transportation network to clear checks—
may be surprised by the rapid development
of the Fed’s check collection operation.
How did a new organization put a national
collection infrastructure in place so quickly?
In fact, the Fed did not create a new
infrastructure to collect checks.  Instead, it
used the existing national infrastructure for
communication: the postal service.  Banks
mailed checks to the Reserve Banks for col-
lection, and the Reserve Banks mailed checks
to paying banks.  As explained above,
banking law discouraged collecting banks
from sending checks directly to paying
banks, but the Fed asserted its legal authority
to obtain payment at par from member
banks for checks sent to them through the
mail (Jones 1931, p. 138).  The FRA did not
alter private banks’ authority to obtain par
collection from other banks.  In terms of the
theoretical framework presented above, the
Fed’s use of the postal service for check col-
lection at par was a regulatory innovation.
EFFECTS ON PAYMENTS
SYSTEM EFFICIENCY
To investigate whether evidence is
consistent with the view that the Fed’s pay-
ment services improved the efﬁciency of
the payments system, this section looks at
the effects on transaction costs, the
national credit market, bank operating
costs, cash assets, and the rapid adoption
of Fed payment services by the banking
industry.18
Transaction Costs and the National
Credit Market
In the theoretical framework presented
above, the Fed’s payment services increase
payments system efﬁciency if they shift the
FF frontier in such a way that society is on
a higher indifference curve, a higher level
of social welfare.  The most relevant evidence
of increased social welfare would be a posi-
tive macroeconomic shock that could be
attributed to the development of Reserve
Bank payment services.
If the Fed’s collection system had its
intended effects, it would tend to reduce
transaction costs for payments across
regions.  In turn, reductions in the costs
of interregional transactions would tend
to facilitate the operation of a national
capital market, rather than separate
regional capital markets, each with its
own balance of supply and demand for
capital.  Economic historians have exam-
ined the process by which the national
integration of capital markets occurred 
by tracing patterns in regional interest 
rate differentials (James 1978).
An important challenge in investi-
gating the effects of the Fed’s collection
system is to focus on effects that cannot be
attributed to other aspects of Fed opera-
tions.  To the extent that the Fed’s for-
mation promoted the integration of regional
capital markets into a national market, the
discount window may have been more sig-
niﬁcant than the Reserve Bank collection
system in reducing transaction costs.  Miron
(1986) attributes a change in the seasonal
pattern of interest rates after the forma-
tion of the Fed to the operation of the
discount window.19 The rest of this sec-
tion focuses on evidence that can be tied
more directly to the operation of the Fed’s
collection system.
Operating Costs
In terms of the theoretical framework,
evidence of increased efﬁciency in the
operation of the payments system would
include reduced operating costs for
banks—for instance, smaller ratios of
operating expenses to total assets and
lower ratios of employees per dollar of
assets.  Unfortunately, such data are not
available for the period around the time
when the Federal Reserve was founded.
Cash Assets
One cost component in the payments
system was the opportunity cost to banks
of holding cash assets.  Banks had two
major reasons for holding cash in their
vaults and balances with other banks: to
facilitate payment-order processing and to
meet reserve requirements.  If the Fed’s
payment services improved the efﬁciency
of the payments system, we should be able
18In their assessment of the Fed’s
role in check collection, Duprey
and Nelson (1986) mention
that the Fed failed to achieve
its goal of universal participa-
tion in its national system of
par check collection, but they
conclude that the Fed did
improve the efﬁciency of inter-
community check collection. 
19The work by Miron (1986)
generated controversy.  See
Canova (1991), Clark (1986),
Fishe (1991), Fishe and
Wohar (1990), Holland and
Toma (1991), and Mankiw,
Miron, and Weil (1987 and
1990).  There is general agree-
ment among these authors that
the seasonal pattern of interest
rates in the United States
changed after the formation of
the Fed, with stronger consen-
sus that the Fed changed the
seasonal pattern of interest
rates after 1917.
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banks to operate with smaller percentages
of their assets in cash, independent of the
effects of changes in reserve requirements.
Fed payment services may have per-
mitted banks to operate with lower cash
ratios for the following reasons.  First, cash
holdings, which included uncollected funds,
would decline to the extent that the Fed’s
check-clearing operations reduced the num-
ber of days required for checks to clear by
eliminating indirect routing of checks to
paying banks.  Second, Fed payment ser-
vices may have reduced the interbank
balances that banks needed to maintain 
for clearing checks, since they could send
checks to the Fed for collection.
An important challenge in assessing
the effects of the Fed’s payment services 
on bank cash holdings is to separate their
effects on indicators of payments system
efﬁciency from the effects of other changes
unrelated to the Fed’s payment services.
The FRA reduced reserve requirements
substantially for national banks, which
were required to be Fed members.  The
Comptroller of the Currency (1915) calcu-
lated the reductions in required reserves
for national banks as follows: 28 percent
for national banks located in central reserve
cities, 41 percent for banks in reserve cities,
and 26 percent for national banks located
elsewhere (see appendix for details).  In
addition, there was a reduction in required
reserve ratios for Fed members in 1917.
Because these changes occurred around the
time the Fed developed its payment ser-
vices, this section examines the effects of
the Fed’s payment services on the cash
ratios of state-chartered banks.
About half of the states reduced their
reserve requirements around the time the
Fed was founded (see appendix).  This 
division creates a type of experiment:  If
the cash ratios of state-chartered banks
declined around the time the Fed devel-
oped its payment services, were the
declines limited to banks in states that
reduced their reserve requirements?
Figures 2 and 3 present the relevant
ratios of cash to total assets for the years
1900 through 1930.  Figure 2 presents
cash ratios for national and state-chartered
banks in states that lowered their reserve
requirements in the years 1913 through
1925 (see appendix for the list of states).  
A wide gap exists between the cash ratios
of national and state-chartered banks prior
to the Fed’s formation.  Cash ratios of
national and state-chartered banks declined
sharply around the time the Fed was founded.
Because of the reserve-requirement reduc-
tions, it is not possible to attribute the
cash-ratio reductions in Figure 2 to the
introduction of the Fed’s collection system.20
Figure 3 presents the same ratios for
national and state-chartered banks in states
that did not reduce their reserve require-
ments in the years 1913 through 1925.
The cash ratios of the state-chartered banks
declined about 5 to 6 percentage points
during the period of rapid growth in the
Fed’s check-collection system, and these
ratios remained at a new lower level
throughout the 1920s.  This pattern of
change in the cash ratios of state banks in
Figure 3, which is similar to the pattern in
Figure 2, can be attributed to the Fed’s col-
lection system, since these states did not
reduce their reserve requirements.  The
impact of the Fed’s collection system is esti-
mated at about 5 percent of the total assets of
banks, which were liberated for other uses.21
General Acceptance of Reserve
Bank Payment Services
Banks chose to use the Reserve Bank
payment services, even though they were
free to continue using the payment arrange-
ments that had been available prior to the
formation of the Fed.  Acceptance of these
services was rapid and on a large scale,
indicating that the Reserve Banks met a
demand for efﬁcient interregional payment
services that had been unmet through pri-
vate arrangements. Banks would not have
chosen to use Reserve Bank payment
services if those provided by private
parties had been more efﬁcient.
Elimination of the Markets for Domestic
Exchange. Changes in the payments sys-
tem that can be tied directly to Reserve
20The numerator of the cash ratio
includes the value of vault
cash, balances with other
banks, and CIPC.  The denomi-
nator is total assets.  Since
banks held cash primarily to
serve their customers who
made payments out of demand
deposits, a more ideal ratio
might be cash to demand
deposits.  Data on the deposit
liabilities of banks for the peri-
od covered in Figures 2 and 3
were of relatively poor quality,
especially the division of
deposits between demand and
other deposits.  See Board of
Governors (1959).  For this
reason, cash ratios in this arti-
cle use total assets as the
denominator.
21Another factor that might have
inﬂuenced the cash ratios of
banks around the time that the
Fed developed its collection ser-
vice was the ﬁnancing of World
War I.  State-chartered banks
increased their holdings of U.S.
government securities substan-
tially during the war, from less
than half of 1 percent in 1916
to about 9 percent in 1918.
With more liquid assets, banks
may have been comfortable
operating with lower cash ratios
than before.  The ratio of U.S.
government securities to assets
declined after 1918, however,
falling to around 6 percent by
1929.  If the securities hold-
ings of banks explained their
declines in cash ratios after
1916, we would expect the
cash ratio to rise again after
1918, which did not happen.  
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two forms of economic activity: trading in
domestic markets for exchange, and ship-
ment of coin and currency among regions
of the nation to arbitrage differences in
domestic exchange rates.  Under the Fed-
eral Reserve System, shipments of gold and
currency for interbank settlement were
almost wholly eliminated (Burgess 1927,
p. 82).  Garbade and Silber (1979, p. 15)
report that by 1918 (the year the Fed
opened its leased wire system for reserve
transfers among banks), newspapers
reported domestic exchange rates essen-
tially at par, and by 1920 they ceased
reporting exchange rates.  The timing of
the elimination of the markets for domes-
tic exchange indicates that the most
important factor was the opening of the
Fed’s wire transfer system, although access
of member banks to reserves through the
discount window may have limited the
variation in exchange rates among cities.
Network Effects and the Timing of
Growth in Fed Payment Services.  The
timing of growth in the Fed’s collection
system is consistent with the view that the
Reserve Banks satisﬁed a demand for more
efﬁcient interregional check collection.  In
1915, the dollar value of checks cleared by
the Fed was only about 3 percent of the
dollar value of checks cleared through the
private clearinghouses.  Under the volun-
tary system of 1915, member banks did
not have to join the Fed’s collection system.
If they joined, however, they had to agree to
pay at par when the Fed presented checks.  
The limited response from banks to the
Fed’s offer of a voluntary collection service
reﬂects the nature of the payments system
as a network good.  Network effects are
exhibited when the demand by an indivi-
dual customer depends on the number of
other customers who use the good.22 While
many banks might have viewed a par col-
lection system as valuable in principle, the
value of such a system to each bank would
depend on the number of other banks that
had agreed to join.  When only a small per-
centage of banks agreed to pay the Fed at
par, others had limited interest in joining.
Why should they forgo some of their rev-
enue from exchange charges if the new
collection system could make par present-
ment to only a small percentage of banks?
The Fed changed its collection system
substantially in 1916: All member banks
were required to pay at par for checks pre-
sented by the Fed, and the Reserve Banks
began charging the banks that deposited
checks fees to cover their collection costs.
The Reserve Banks’ check-clearing volume
began growing rapidly immediately after
these changes were implemented.
The timing of this growth does not sup-
port the hypothesis that it occurred because
the Reserve Banks had suspended the prac-
22For analysis of network effects,
see Katz and Shapiro (1994)
and Economides and White
(1994).
MAY/JUNE  1998












Ratio of Total Cash Assets to Total Assets:
States That Lowered Reserve Requirements, 1913-25
1900  1905  1910  1915  1920  1925  1930












Ratio of Total Cash Assets to Total Assets:
States That Did Not Lower Their Reserve Requirements,
1913-25
1900  1905  1910  1915  1920  1925  1930
SOURCE:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1959).
Figure 3tice of charging fees to depositing banks.
The Fed’s collection system had already
grown to a relatively large share of national
check collection by the time the Fed
stopped charging collection fees in 1918.
The Fed’s share continued to rise after 1918,
but at a slower pace than in the period from
1915 to 1918.  The most important action 
to stimulate growth of its collection system
appears to have been the Fed’s decision to
require all member banks to pay at par for
checks presented by the Reserve Banks.
Demand for a Par Collection Service and
the Geographic Location of Paying Banks.
Critics of the payments system prior to the
formation of the Fed acknowledged that
check collection was efﬁcient where
collecting and paying banks were located
in the same communities, but they wanted
a more efﬁcient mechanism for inter-
regional check collection.  If these critics
were correct, banks would ﬁnd the Fed’s
collection system valuable as a means of
interregional check collection, not a mech-
anism for local collection.
In 1918, the Fed began reporting infor-
mation on the location of the banks at
which the Reserve Banks presented checks
for collection.  Table 2 indicates that only
about 10 percent of the checks were pre-
sented to banks in the cities where the Fed
had ofﬁces.  Table 2 also indicates that the
dollar denomination of checks presented to
banks in cities where the Reserve Banks had
ofﬁces was much larger on average than the
size of checks drawn on banks located out-
side the Reserve Bank cities.  These dif-
ferences in the average dollar size of checks,
which were pronounced in each of the 12
Districts, probably indicate that a relatively
high percentage of the checks presented to
banks where the Reserve Banks had ofﬁces
involved interbank settlements rather than
checks written by bank customers, since
interbank reserve transfers tended to be
much larger than most checks.23
CONCLUSIONS
Histories of the Fed’s payment services
generally focus on the Fed’s failure to
achieve its goal of getting all banks to 
participate in a national system for
collecting checks at par.  This article uses 
a different standard of evaluation: effects
on the efﬁciency of the payments system.
While the goal of universal par check 
collection remained out of reach for the 
Fed in its early years, evidence from the
period when the Fed was founded suggests
that the Fed’s services improved payments
system efﬁciency.
This analysis suggests that Reserve
Bank payment services grew in popularity
because they permitted banks to operate
with lower ratios of cash to total assets.
The relevant evidence is for banks char-
tered in states that did not reduce their
reserve requirements around the time when
the Fed was founded.  Ratios of cash to
assets for these banks declined about 5 per-
centage points during the period of rapid
development in the Fed’s payment services
and then remained at the new lower level.
For national banks and state-chartered
banks in other states, changes in cash ratios
reﬂect changes in reserve requirements, in
addition to the effects of Reserve Bank pay-
ment services.  
Banks chose to use the Fed’s payment
services rather than the payment arrange-
ments that were available to them prior to
the Fed’s formation.  By 1920 the Fed’s wire
transfer service had eliminated the old
system of interregional settlement among
banks, which had involved the use of drafts
on New York City banks and the markets
for domestic exchange.  The share of checks
cleared through the Reserve Banks rose
dramatically after the Board acted in 1916
to require member banks to pay the Fed at
par, despite the fee per check that each
Reserve Bank began charging collecting
banks in that same year.  The Fed’s check-
collection activities involved primarily
interregional collection of checks, and
banks found the Fed’s system more attrac-
tive than the old system of collecting
interregional checks through correspon-
dents.  The growth in the Reserve Banks’
collections indicates that banks’ demands
for a national par collection service had
been unmet prior to the Fed’s formation.
23Transactions involving the
Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston and the Boston Clearing
House Association (BCHA) illus-
trate the use of Reserve Bank
clearing services for interbank
settlement.  In November
1914, the Boston Fed became
a limited member of the BCHA.
The manager of the BCHA
opened an account at the
Boston Fed for settlement
among members of the clear-
inghouse.  Members in net
debit positions paid the man-
agers of the BCHA with checks
drawn upon their accounts at
the Reserve Bank, and the
manager paid the members in
net credit positions with checks
drawn upon the account of the
BCHA at the Boston Fed.  The
checks in Table 2 presented by
the Boston Fed to Boston
banks included the checks writ-
ten by members of the BCHA
to cover their net debit posi-
tions at the BCHA.
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This appendix provides details on
changes in federal and state reserve
requirements that occurred more or less
simultaneously with the introduction of
the Federal Reserve System, because such
changes allow us to draw conclusions
about the effects of Reserve Bank services
on banks’ ratios of cash to total assets.
Under the Federal Reserve Act (FRA),
national banks were required to become
members of the Federal Reserve System,
and the FRA reduced reserve requirements
for national banks substantially.  Just prior
to FRA’s passage, reserve requirements
were 25 percent of total deposits for
national banks in central reserve cities
(three major ﬁnancial centers) and reserve
cities (other important regional ﬁnancial
centers), and 15 percent for national banks
located elsewhere (commonly called the
“country” national banks).  Banks in central
reserve cities were required to hold all of
their reserves as vault cash, whereas those
located in reserve cities could hold up to
half of their reserves as deposits at banks in
central reserve cities, and country banks
could hold 60 percent with banks located
in reserve cities or central reserve cities.
Under the FRA, as enacted in 1913,
reserve requirements for Fed members were
different for demand and time deposits.
For all member banks, the reserve requirement
on time deposits was 5 percent, while the
requirements on demand deposits were as
follows: for banks located in central reserve
cities, 18 percent; for those located in
reserve cities, 15 percent; and for country
member banks, 12 percent.  As described
in the text, calculations by the Comptroller
of the Currency (1915) indicated substan-
tial reductions in reserve requirements for
national banks under the FRA.
It is difﬁcult to estimate the effect of
these changes on the cash assets of national
banks, for the following reasons:  Under the
1913 version of the FRA, only vault cash
and balances at the Fed counted as part of
reserves; balances with other banks were
excluded from reserves.  This exclusion of
interbank balances limited the effects of the
lower reserve requirements on the demand
for cash by country national banks and
national banks located in reserve cities in
two ways.  First, any collected balances
that these national banks held with other
banks did not count as reserves.  In addi-
tion, the new requirements eliminated the
practice of counting uncollected funds as
part of reserves.  For banks that collected
checks through the Reserve Banks, uncol-
lected funds were classiﬁed as cash items 
in the process of collection and, therefore,
were not counted as part of reserves.
Fed reserve requirements were reduced
again in 1917.  On time deposits of all mem-
bers, they were reduced from 5 percent to 
3 percent.  On demand deposits, they were
reduced for banks in central reserve cities,
from 18 percent to 13 percent; for banks in
reserve cities, from 15 percent to 10 percent;
and for country banks, from 12 percent to 7
percent.  These changes had an offsetting effect
on the demand for cash by member banks:
Vault cash no longer counted as reserves; only
balances in reserve accounts at the Reserve
Banks were ofﬁcially designated reserves.
Thus, the reserve requirement changes
at the federal level were large, and their
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effects on the demand for cash by member
banks were so complex that it would be dif-
ﬁcult to separate them from other effects,
such as the Fed’s collection service.  Another
possible approach is to examine changes in
cash ratios of state banks around the time
the Fed developed its payment services.
About half the states lowered their reserve
requirements around the time the Fed was
founded, as indicated in Table A1.  These
state actions can be treated as an experiment.
The issue is whether the ratios of cash to
assets declined for state banks in those states
that did not lower their reserve requirements
around the time the Reserve Banks devel-
oped their payment services.  The text
presents the evidence on this experiment.